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internetzdude t1_j9bl8ai wrote

I'm fine with many things the author states but find the idea that axiology is not part of ethics somewhat counter-productive. In my opinion, the deontic realm the author talks about is one branch of ethics and axiology is another branch of ethics. That is also how it has been conceived traditionally. That the author wants to banish all axiology from ethics seems to be based on the idea that values are somehow personal and agent-relative from the start, but only few people would subscribe to this view. Even utilitarians have proposed more elaborate views of value, for example Harsanyi takes informed preferences under some veil of ignorance construction as the basis of his theory. I'm not a utilitarian, but I would defend axiology as an independent and inherently normative part of ethics that is not reducible to deontology (or vice versa).

To make this clear, however, I think that only part of value theory belongs to ethics. There are plenty of values that are not morally relevant.

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contractualist OP t1_j9bpilj wrote

Thanks for reading! What values do you find intrinsic?

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internetzdude t1_j9buiqb wrote

Intrinsic? Friendship would be an example. Scanlon devotes a chapter to this topic in his "What We Owe to Each Other." Anyway, value realists do not even need to assume that some values are intrinsic. Which values are intersubjective or even objective depends on whether there are facts that make corresponding value statements true and on the nature of these facts. Such facts could be moral facts, but they could also be aesthetic or prudential, for example, or there could be a naturalist position that grounds them in empirical facts about humans in general. It really depends on the kind of value theory you think is the right one.

As a metaethicist I'm undecided about this / don't think there is a clear solution. IMHO, claiming there are moral or aesthetic facts is in many ways problematic and dubious.

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contractualist OP t1_j9c4ion wrote

My reading of Scanlon's account of value would still be that they are agent-relative, and have reason-creating power. Friendship wouldn't be inherently valuable independent of our judgments of it being so. Yet given our judgments of it being valuable, it provides reasons for certain actions.

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internetzdude t1_j9c6yph wrote

I think you might be right, I wrote from memory and would have to re-read the relevant passages. I've always been skeptic of intrinsic values, so maybe I too easily thought Scanlon provides an example of it. Scanlon discusses the example primarily as an example against consequentialism, though, which is another matter.

But there might be another terminological misunderstanding here because in my opinion the question whether there are intrinsic values or not is irrelevant to the value realism I hinted at. There can objective (or, at least intersubjective) agent-relative values regardless of whether they count as intrinsic or not. For instance, you can be a utilitarian and consider utility a type of agent-relative, objective value. What is best for each person depends on that person in this view, yet it's not a subjective matter what is best and people are frequently wrong about it.

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contractualist OP t1_j9c97mb wrote

I wouldn't say morality is divorced from ethics either. To have normative reasons, you need values that create those reasons, which I argue are freedom and reason. However, there are objective reasons to act given those values, which belong in the reason core (along with logic and mathematics). Value themselves, since they are agent-relative, would be in the freedom-residual.

In this case, what I am distinguishing are concepts that are either agent-independent or agent-relative, since we might be getting lost on objective/subjective.

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internetzdude t1_j9cfzh3 wrote

I understand the motivation and what you say but can't agree. IMHO the object/subjective distinction is indispensable, without it you cannot understand metaethical positions that talk about agent-relative, objective values. For example, if someone is an extrovert and likes meeting people, then it can be objectively good for them to have the opportunity to do so (notwithstanding conflicts with other values or reasons against it). But the value is clearly agent-relative, since there are also introverts with other needs. Many human needs are like that.

The attribute "subjective" is a bit special in my opinion, however, since it is better to speak of personal preferences instead of subjective values. These reflect what people like and what they prefer at a time. We do not generally talk about these as values, although sometimes we'd call some of them "personal values."

Orthogonal to these distinctions is in my opinion the agent-relative vs. agent-independent axis. Basically any kind of value that concerns a human is agent-relative.

To cut a long story short, agent-relative vs. agent-independent is one axis, subjective vs. object another axis, and absolute vs. relative yet another axis. I accept all distinctions, it's just is part of my personal view that talking about subjective values is a bit of a misnomer.

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contractualist OP t1_j9d05zg wrote

I get absolute vs. relative, but I treat agent-relative and agent independent the same as objective and subjective. If you have time, could you explain what I'm missing or point me in the right direction? If there is a distinction, I'll have to re-work my writing.

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internetzdude t1_j9g8j2u wrote

Francesco Orsi makes similar distinctions as I do. Orsi (2015): Value Theory. Bloomsbury Academic. It gives some taxonomy, otherwise I don't think it's very interesting. Here is my take, but whether you think these are examples of the types of values really depends on your metaethical stances:

+ subjective and agent-relative:

John: Becoming a lawyer is better for me than becoming a clarinetist. I appreciate the better job prospects and payment in the long run and I'm not really sure I would continue to like music if I became a professional musician.

John: Bungee jumping is great, it's better than going on a hike.

+ objective and agent-relative:

It is better for John not to become a lawyer and pursue a career as a clarinetist. John would probably not even pass the bar exams and the profession would invariably burn him out. He doesn't have the personality for it.

Bungee jumping is horrible for John. Because of some traumatic experience as a child, he's afraid of heights. However, he isn't aware of that yet.

+ subjective and agent independent:

John: Basic democracy is better than representational democracy. At least, I'd much prefer to live in a direct basic democracy.

+ objective and agent independent:

For various reasons <long list of reasons>, basic democracy is vulnerable to disruption and representational democracy is much better.

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contractualist OP t1_j9hh3n4 wrote

>+ objective and agent-relative:

It is better for John not to become a lawyer and pursue a career as a clarinetist. John would probably not even pass the bar exams and the profession would invariably burn him out. He doesn't have the personality for it.

Woah, this definitely sneaks in valuing well-being. If we replaced it with "challenge seeking" or "self-development", we'd have a different ruling. And how do you decide between which values are truly objective, well-being or challenge? I actually discuss this issue in my last section here (although my thoughts need some more fleshing out)

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internetzdude t1_j9l0351 wrote

My view so far is roughly speaking naturalist/pragmatic in the sense that we figure out which values are truly objective in the same way as we would figure this out about any other issue. Maybe it's more about the stance towards a specific value. We sometimes speak of specific values in strongly realist ways. Whether we're right or wrong about this is a matter of nature, and, if you want to put it in these terms, concerns value epistemology. Although I'm sympathetic with error theory as a critique, I find it overall not very credible as a statement about all value.

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rejectednocomments t1_j9d2l98 wrote

As I said regarding one of your previous pieces, I am very sympathetic to the idea that morality is closely connected with what we could all reasonably agree to in principle. But, I have some issues with what you say here.

You say that morality only concerns issues of right and wrong, and does not concern good and bad, or value. You also say that good/bad/value is subjective. I think there is a substantive debate as to whether good/bad/value is subjective or objective. Maybe more importantly, it seems like good, bad, and value are a part of morality, just as much as right and wrong.

I see that you want to use the distinction between right and wrong, on the one hand, and good and bad on the other, to try to show that relativists and non-relativists are talking past one another. To the extent that they are, I think there’s probably a better way of capturing this than removing good and bad from the sphere of moral consideration.

I also worry about how limited the moral sphere seems to be on your view. It seems like if there’s any sort or controversy about an issue, it turns out to be a personal issue and not a moral one. But, surely part of the point of moral philosophy is to try to find answers where there is controversy. A moral theory that only applies in cases of universal agreement is impotent.

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contractualist OP t1_j9db1ki wrote

Thanks for the review!

I'll probably write more about my thoughts on value, but I do come in with the assumption that value isn't intrinsic but a creation by free, conscious beings. And if value isn't intrinsic but subjective, it can't be publicly examined and judged. There's no point of reference to say that one value is right due to X property and the other is wrong
due to Y property. These values might give our lives meaning, but are not reason based the way that morality is (which is a product of certain values).

If you think there is a better way to capture the dispute between realists and relativists, I'd appreciate any insight. My writing is only my perspective and the reason I share it is so I can get feedback like this.

I wouldn't say any controversy makes an issue personal, but only ones where there are reasonable enough arguments on both sides that choosing one or the other would be acceptable. I do think this is the case for the Trolley Problem so that its not a duty to pull the lever.

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rejectednocomments t1_j9dh9nz wrote

I don’t think you should be so quick to reject the possibility that value could be objective. But if you want to go with the assumption that value is subjective, you might want to look at how subjectivists about value have tried to incorporate values into their moral theories.

Some of the disagreement between relativists and non-relativists might be due to a failure to adequately distinguish morals from mores; that is, genuine moral principles from social custom and expectation.

I think it would be helpful if you clarified what falls within the moral sphere and what doesn’t. I worry that you’re position excludes things that should be part of morality, but it’s hard to say for sure at this point.

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contractualist OP t1_j9er0xy wrote

Thank you! I’ll look into those matters and will be more explicit with the principles I believe would arise from a reasonable agreement.

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atheistfromkashmir t1_j9bfqle wrote

Morality is not what a higher being says, it is what is logically better for well being and will reduce human suffering so that our human society can coordinate. I believe in Utilitarianism and Contractism with both with some touch of evolutionary genetics and cognitive revolution. Science have a say on morality as an imagined reality by cognitive revolution.

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swissco t1_j9cbqa9 wrote

There are things that are immoral that cause no suffering to anyone. For example: hypothetically, a man who delights in imagining pedophilc acts only in his mind, but never acts on them. Would that be a moral man? I think not.

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EducatorBig6648 t1_j9ev5yn wrote

He could still be a moral man, it depends on other factors. Is he planning on doing more than just keep imagining?

We can't judge a man for fantasies, no matter what they are. In that sense Batman Begins has it right, it's not who we are inside, that changes a little every day.

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contractualist OP t1_j9bgs9p wrote

I agree! But its also something that has to be accepted. I wouldn't say morality requires us to sacrifice ourselves for the public good. The acceptance condition shouldn't be left out in our definition of morality.

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SvetlanaButosky t1_j9e750b wrote

Morality is a combination of mutual biological (natural) needs/preferences and rational reasoning using our higher cognitive function.

Basically a consensus of nature and nurture among people.

I also agree that it wont lead to repugnant conclusion, because people actually like quality and quantity at the same time, they wont give up quality just to increase quantity, that's just absurd backsliding, I dont understand why people think the repugnant conclusion is even preferrable by any sane person. lol

As for utilitarianism, it depends, if negative utilitarianism, then sure its absurd and people simply dont assess their own lives that way, but positive utilitarianism could lead to perpetual improvement of morality based on consensus of human preference, see above.

Libertarianism is less about morality and more about individual liberty, but taken to the extreme absolutist sense, which is an unconvincing argument as whatever "liberty" you have cannot exist in a vacuum, it comes with the price of mutual benefit, cooperation and compromise, unless you live alone in the mountains. lol

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EducatorBig6648 t1_j9excvq wrote

I agree with several things the author states but I would assert certain things I consider facts:

"Value" is a myth, it is neither objective or subjective but fiction. As is "need/necessity". As are "rights" and "duty/responsiblity/obligation/owing". As is "importance". As is "authority" and "legality".

The author mentions "keeping “the good” and “the right” in their separate categories". I agree with the statment but in an opposite way. Morality is not about right and wrong (i.e. accurate and inaccurate, 1+1=42 is not immoral), it is (to simplify) about good and evil (rape is not inaccurate, it is malevolent hence evil hence immoral).

Also, I feel the author is a bit... disingenious when pointing out that "ought" is illogical yet feels that a comprehensible public term "should" inform "our ethics and political authority and legal ontology". "Should" is a myth, we're free to nuke the planet like it's the '60s over the Cuban missile crisis.

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XiphosAletheria t1_j9fo6gm wrote

I mean, this is just silly. "Morality is what 'reasonable people' would agree to" might work if you want to say morality is subjective, because of course reasonable people across different times and places have had very different views of what is moral. But to define morality as that while claiming it is objective falls flat.

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contractualist OP t1_j9g9et8 wrote

Yes this is meta ethical constructivism. I will argue later on that was is objective is just shared subjectivity, so my argument fits into our normal notion of objective. People might actually disagree based on private reasons but I ask what they would agree to based on public reasons. There will be agreement on morals claims the same way there is agreement on objective reality.

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XiphosAletheria t1_j9gqepu wrote

> There will be agreement on morals claims the same way there is agreement on objective reality.

Except there won't be. Just off-hand you can find reasonable people who disagree about the morality of, say, the death penalty, abortion, eating meat, etc. And that's within one culture. If you look at other cultures, you'll see reasonable people disagreeing about things we agree on here - such as slavery, human sacrifice, marital rape, etc.

And anyway, "objective" is not the same as "subjective, but a bunch of people agree with me".

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contractualist OP t1_j9i1cym wrote

It’s not about actual consent but what would reasonable people agree to. No way would anyone reasonably agree to be enslaved, sacrificed, or raped. Abortion and eating meat relate to the boundaries of our moral community (not necessarily the agreement, but who is a party) whereas the death penalty (given certain evidence) may be morally excused.

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XiphosAletheria t1_j9id7c3 wrote

> No way would anyone reasonably agree to be enslaved, sacrificed, or raped...whereas the death penalty (given certain evidence) may be morally excused.

You see the contradiction there, right? No way would anyone reasonably agree to be executed. For that matter, if we hadn't been raised in a society where involuntary taxation was the norm, I doubt many reasonable people would agree to it. That is, just because I wouldn't reasonably agree to have X happen to me doesn't mean society might not morally do X to me anyway under certain circumstances.

And I don't see the point of your argument anyway. Let's say there is some set of moral norms that we all agree to be true. That doesn't help us. What we need is a guide for when we have moral disagreements between reasonable people. At best, you'll end up stating something glaringly obvious (since we all apparently agree with it anyway). At worst, and this seems far more likely, you'll have people using your idea as way to simply dismiss anyone who disagrees with them as both unreasonable and immoral, which is the opposite of the mindset any thoughtful person, and especially a philosopher, ought to have.

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contractualist OP t1_j9j91rn wrote

  1. People may agree to execute criminals and will very likely agree to involuntary taxation, given the coordination problem and benefits of collective action.

  2. The article’s goal is only to say what morality is and isn’t. To the extent that issue is in dispute, as it is in meta-ethics, then having at the very least a defined term is useful for settling disagreement. I’ll get into more specifics in later pieces on what “reasonably rejectable” really means.

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Purely_Theoretical t1_j9hk63u wrote

> libertarianism adopts a person-affecting view, whereby the moral status of an act depends on the rights and consent only of affected living people.

Is this an axiom or a conclusion? If axiom, it is a strawman. If conclusion, a non sequitur.

> To give future people rights under libertarianism would already be accepting a hypothetical social contract since future people cannot actually consent.

This is a non sequitur. Pure libertarian principles confer rights and obligations to people where it might be known who the victim will be, and exactly what will happen to him, but it might be temporarily impossible to communicate with him. Or it might be known that some person or other will be the victim of an act, but it might be impossible to find out which person. This naturally extends to future generations.

You may also consider the scifi case where a man does not exist today, but will miraculously exist tomorrow. In such a case, it is immoral to build a trap that would kill the man when he materializes.

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contractualist OP t1_j9hqt1g wrote

It wouldn’t give them the right to have gains preserved for them. That’s not a right I have heard from any libertarian theory. So long as the lockean proviso is met, there is no duty to benefit the future. And future people wouldn’t accept such a lottery.

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Purely_Theoretical t1_j9hslce wrote

That paper is proof you are wrong about the lockean proviso and wrong in your conclusion.

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contractualist OP t1_j9hvdij wrote

Again, the paper just argues a Lockean proviso. Not the best deal future people would be getting.

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Purely_Theoretical t1_j9hx34u wrote

The entire point of that paper is to give a libertarian justification for having concern for future generations. Namely it extends the lockean proviso to them. I summarized the paper in my first comment.

Therefore, libertarianism does not fail to account for future generations. This is your false claim and I have refuted it.

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contractualist OP t1_j9hyfdl wrote

(Up to the lockean proviso, which I state in the post. This is too minimal to be substantive).

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contractualist OP t1_j9bezym wrote

Hello all, I appreciated the feedback I got on my previous piece. This is a follow-up, and I'd be happy to respond to any additional feedback.

Summary: Since morality is those principles that can not be reasonably rejected based on public reasons, morality would exclude those principles that are motivated by private reasons. This includes one's conception of the good, sense of meaning, and personal values. While these values are what makes life worth living, they couldn't be reasonably accepted by others and therefore lack moral authority. They aren't objective properties that can be analyzed and judged, but are subjective properties that we impose on the world. They would be in the "freedom residual" of our lives, whereas morality is in the "reason core." Meta-ethics is about finding out what claims belong where. Additionally, given the "acceptance" condition of morality, the Repugnant Conclusion, utilitarianism, and libertarianism would also be excluded as ethical determinations.

I get that this is controversial, but this article only seeks to defend the current definition of morality that hopefully can be used more often in moral discourse.

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