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contractualist OP t1_j9bpilj wrote

Reply to comment by internetzdude in What Morality is Not (and why it's not the Repugnant Conclusion, Utilitarianism, or Libertarianism) by contractualist

Thanks for reading! What values do you find intrinsic?

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internetzdude t1_j9buiqb wrote

Intrinsic? Friendship would be an example. Scanlon devotes a chapter to this topic in his "What We Owe to Each Other." Anyway, value realists do not even need to assume that some values are intrinsic. Which values are intersubjective or even objective depends on whether there are facts that make corresponding value statements true and on the nature of these facts. Such facts could be moral facts, but they could also be aesthetic or prudential, for example, or there could be a naturalist position that grounds them in empirical facts about humans in general. It really depends on the kind of value theory you think is the right one.

As a metaethicist I'm undecided about this / don't think there is a clear solution. IMHO, claiming there are moral or aesthetic facts is in many ways problematic and dubious.

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contractualist OP t1_j9c4ion wrote

My reading of Scanlon's account of value would still be that they are agent-relative, and have reason-creating power. Friendship wouldn't be inherently valuable independent of our judgments of it being so. Yet given our judgments of it being valuable, it provides reasons for certain actions.

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internetzdude t1_j9c6yph wrote

I think you might be right, I wrote from memory and would have to re-read the relevant passages. I've always been skeptic of intrinsic values, so maybe I too easily thought Scanlon provides an example of it. Scanlon discusses the example primarily as an example against consequentialism, though, which is another matter.

But there might be another terminological misunderstanding here because in my opinion the question whether there are intrinsic values or not is irrelevant to the value realism I hinted at. There can objective (or, at least intersubjective) agent-relative values regardless of whether they count as intrinsic or not. For instance, you can be a utilitarian and consider utility a type of agent-relative, objective value. What is best for each person depends on that person in this view, yet it's not a subjective matter what is best and people are frequently wrong about it.

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contractualist OP t1_j9c97mb wrote

I wouldn't say morality is divorced from ethics either. To have normative reasons, you need values that create those reasons, which I argue are freedom and reason. However, there are objective reasons to act given those values, which belong in the reason core (along with logic and mathematics). Value themselves, since they are agent-relative, would be in the freedom-residual.

In this case, what I am distinguishing are concepts that are either agent-independent or agent-relative, since we might be getting lost on objective/subjective.

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internetzdude t1_j9cfzh3 wrote

I understand the motivation and what you say but can't agree. IMHO the object/subjective distinction is indispensable, without it you cannot understand metaethical positions that talk about agent-relative, objective values. For example, if someone is an extrovert and likes meeting people, then it can be objectively good for them to have the opportunity to do so (notwithstanding conflicts with other values or reasons against it). But the value is clearly agent-relative, since there are also introverts with other needs. Many human needs are like that.

The attribute "subjective" is a bit special in my opinion, however, since it is better to speak of personal preferences instead of subjective values. These reflect what people like and what they prefer at a time. We do not generally talk about these as values, although sometimes we'd call some of them "personal values."

Orthogonal to these distinctions is in my opinion the agent-relative vs. agent-independent axis. Basically any kind of value that concerns a human is agent-relative.

To cut a long story short, agent-relative vs. agent-independent is one axis, subjective vs. object another axis, and absolute vs. relative yet another axis. I accept all distinctions, it's just is part of my personal view that talking about subjective values is a bit of a misnomer.

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contractualist OP t1_j9d05zg wrote

I get absolute vs. relative, but I treat agent-relative and agent independent the same as objective and subjective. If you have time, could you explain what I'm missing or point me in the right direction? If there is a distinction, I'll have to re-work my writing.

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internetzdude t1_j9g8j2u wrote

Francesco Orsi makes similar distinctions as I do. Orsi (2015): Value Theory. Bloomsbury Academic. It gives some taxonomy, otherwise I don't think it's very interesting. Here is my take, but whether you think these are examples of the types of values really depends on your metaethical stances:

+ subjective and agent-relative:

John: Becoming a lawyer is better for me than becoming a clarinetist. I appreciate the better job prospects and payment in the long run and I'm not really sure I would continue to like music if I became a professional musician.

John: Bungee jumping is great, it's better than going on a hike.

+ objective and agent-relative:

It is better for John not to become a lawyer and pursue a career as a clarinetist. John would probably not even pass the bar exams and the profession would invariably burn him out. He doesn't have the personality for it.

Bungee jumping is horrible for John. Because of some traumatic experience as a child, he's afraid of heights. However, he isn't aware of that yet.

+ subjective and agent independent:

John: Basic democracy is better than representational democracy. At least, I'd much prefer to live in a direct basic democracy.

+ objective and agent independent:

For various reasons <long list of reasons>, basic democracy is vulnerable to disruption and representational democracy is much better.

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contractualist OP t1_j9hh3n4 wrote

>+ objective and agent-relative:

It is better for John not to become a lawyer and pursue a career as a clarinetist. John would probably not even pass the bar exams and the profession would invariably burn him out. He doesn't have the personality for it.

Woah, this definitely sneaks in valuing well-being. If we replaced it with "challenge seeking" or "self-development", we'd have a different ruling. And how do you decide between which values are truly objective, well-being or challenge? I actually discuss this issue in my last section here (although my thoughts need some more fleshing out)

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internetzdude t1_j9l0351 wrote

My view so far is roughly speaking naturalist/pragmatic in the sense that we figure out which values are truly objective in the same way as we would figure this out about any other issue. Maybe it's more about the stance towards a specific value. We sometimes speak of specific values in strongly realist ways. Whether we're right or wrong about this is a matter of nature, and, if you want to put it in these terms, concerns value epistemology. Although I'm sympathetic with error theory as a critique, I find it overall not very credible as a statement about all value.

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