Dennett and compatibilists at large are not arguing for the existence of libertarian freewill, which is the kind of freewill Sam Harris is good at debunking.
The idea of libertarian freewill (that the will is a law unto itself, free from external causation) either belongs in the category of magical thinking or debunked hypotheses à la phlogiston theory and the luminiferous aether.
Dennett agrees with all of that. Compatibilists agree that the universe is deterministic, that's why they're compatibilists.
Dennett brings a far more subtle and important point to the table which he has coined "the freewill worth wanting." This stance is what (among other things) differentiates responsibility from inculpability. There are reasons why, in a brute deterministic world, some people are held responsible for their actions while others are not.
It seems to me that there are two misunderstandings incompatibilists often make,
They operate under the old rubric of libertarian freewill in their discourse, in which case they're talking past the compatibilist.
They haven't done their due diligence with the "and then what happens?" component of the two philosophies. This is where the major differences between the two schools show themselves! This is where- I'd argue- you'd find the reasons why compatibilism is the superior philosophy compared to incompatibilism.
grooverocker t1_j8gbjqe wrote
Reply to comment by SvetlanaButosky in “The principle of protecting our own thinking from eavesdroppers is fundamental to autonomy.” – Daniel Dennett debates the sort of free will it’s worth wanting with neuroscientists Patrick Haggard and philosopher Helen Steward by IAI_Admin
Dennett and compatibilists at large are not arguing for the existence of libertarian freewill, which is the kind of freewill Sam Harris is good at debunking.
The idea of libertarian freewill (that the will is a law unto itself, free from external causation) either belongs in the category of magical thinking or debunked hypotheses à la phlogiston theory and the luminiferous aether.
Dennett agrees with all of that. Compatibilists agree that the universe is deterministic, that's why they're compatibilists.
Dennett brings a far more subtle and important point to the table which he has coined "the freewill worth wanting." This stance is what (among other things) differentiates responsibility from inculpability. There are reasons why, in a brute deterministic world, some people are held responsible for their actions while others are not.
It seems to me that there are two misunderstandings incompatibilists often make,
They operate under the old rubric of libertarian freewill in their discourse, in which case they're talking past the compatibilist.
They haven't done their due diligence with the "and then what happens?" component of the two philosophies. This is where the major differences between the two schools show themselves! This is where- I'd argue- you'd find the reasons why compatibilism is the superior philosophy compared to incompatibilism.