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DrPlatypus1 t1_jdrdwll wrote

Reply to comment by Nickesponja in A Proof of Free Will by philosopher Michael Huemer (University of Colorado, Boulder) by thenousman

The argument demonstrates one way in which determinism is incompatible with standard assumptions of epistemology and moral responsibility. Also, "ought implies can" is about free will, no matter how much silly compatibilists want to pretend otherwise.

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Nickesponja t1_jdreedo wrote

No determinist alive believes that determinism implies that all of our beliefs are true. Hence it's a useless argument.

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Kangewalter t1_je7cukn wrote

That's an intermediate conclusion that Huemer makes, not a premise. You can't just dismiss an argument on the basis that you don't believe in the conclusion. I'm not sure Huemer's argument is sound, but it definitely doesn't depend on whether people who consider themselves determinists believe in the truth of the conclusion. The implausibility of the conclusion is exactly what makes the argument useful and philosophically interesting, because it is supposed to make the determinist position untenable!

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DrPlatypus1 t1_jdrjcpw wrote

Well, no advocate of any position believes the arguments against their view are correct. There's still value in explaining why their views are wrong so that others don't make the same mistake they did.

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Nickesponja t1_jdt0o9a wrote

My point is, consider the following argument:

  1. If the argument above is correct, then if determinism is true, all of our beliefs are true
  2. But clearly, determinism can be true without all of our beliefs being true
  3. Therefore, the argument above is not correct

1 is uncontroversial, 2 is obvious. Hence, there's something wrong with the original argument. Which is probably why it was rejected several times.

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DrPlatypus1 t1_jdvdw98 wrote

If the above argument is correct, then determinism either entails that all of our beliefs are true, or that we shouldn't try to believe what is true. I assume most determinists would deny that we should try to believe what is true, given those options. But if they do that, then they undermine the entire basis of rational discussion and argumentation. So, they have no basis for saying anyone should believe determinism, or, indeed, accept any arguments for anything.

Rationality is about making choices for good reasons. Determinism is incompatible with making choices for reasons at all. The argument is pointing out that this doesn't just negate the legitimacy of moral judgment, or even prudential judgment, but of epistemic judgment as well. Determinism entails that all human beliefs are arational. This entails that all enterprises seeking to judge or affect people's beliefs are as well.

Determinism is incompatible with everything we know about ourselves as rational and moral beings. It's a wildly implausible view. There are also absolutely no good arguments for it. The fact that modern support for naturalism gets people to believe it anyway is comparably as embarrassing to the fact that followers of Parmenides got talked into believing that people can't move. Crappy methods lead to crazy results the followers of them are blind to.

We can walk. We can choose whether to walk or run. We can be irrational and immoral in our choice to walk to a drowning child instead of run. We can be irrational in any choice to believe in whatever crappy view forces us to deny any of these things. Determinism forces us to deny obvious facts about human nature, and it renders rational discussion and judgment impossible. It's a really stupid view. People who choose not to recognize this are wilfully blind to the obvious entailments of their view. It's important not to let that blindness spread to others.

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Nickesponja t1_jdvfd6y wrote

No, the premise of the argument isn't "we should try to believe what's true", it's "we should only believe what's true". A determinist can maintain the former while rejecting the latter. In fact, I don't see why anyone would accept the latter. There are situations where it's impossible to believe only the truth (say, if you're being tricked or lied to in a convincing manner), so saying we have a moral obligation to believe only the truth is absurd (at least, if you accept that ought implies can).

But of course, more generally, a determinist won't accept that ought implies can if by "can" you mean that we have free will to do one thing or the other. But again, that's just obvious.

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Kangewalter t1_je7ecgi wrote

Why would you think Huemer interprets P1 in that way when he explicitly has the ought implies can principle as P2? Obviously, if you can't believe the truth about something (because you don't have access to information, for example), you can't be obliged to believe it. In the comments, Huemer is explicit that P1 is meant in the sense of "if P is false, then you should refrain from believing it."

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Nickesponja t1_je94cjb wrote

> if P is false, then you should refrain from believing it

But this is just false if ought implies can, because there are plenty of situations where you can't help but believe falsehoods (say, when you're being convincingly tricked).

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Kangewalter t1_je7krv2 wrote

You are begging the question. Whether we believe only truths if determinism is true is exactly what is in question. You have to show that Huemer's inference to this conclusion is invalid or that one of the premises is false, not simply stipulate that the conclusion is false.

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Nickesponja t1_je94ljz wrote

Premise 2 in my argument is blatantly obvious. I'm not stipulating some contrived conclusion, I'm just pointing out that clearly, determinism could be true without all of our beliefs being true. There's nothing about determinism that would imply that all of our beliefs are true. This is far easier to defend that any of the premises in Huemer's argument.

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