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zossima t1_j8ggw9b wrote

Reply to comment by tough_truth in “The principle of protecting our own thinking from eavesdroppers is fundamental to autonomy.” – Daniel Dennett debates the sort of free will it’s worth wanting with neuroscientists Patrick Haggard and philosopher Helen Steward by IAI_Admin

“Voluntariness”… the ethical implications of the assumption free will is nonexistent are devastating to the concept of holding individuals responsible for their actions. If an individual does not have real control/agency over their actions, how are those actions truly their fault? Culpability is out the window. And how can an individual be treated as an end-in-itself if we approach them as nothing but a proverbial wind vane fluttering in the wind of reality? I’m into analogies…

Consider the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle. We cannot predict with full accuracy the physical qualities of a particle, like position, from initial conditions. That is, considering all factors at a given time, the “reality” giving context to and influencing a particle, we still can never know what is really going on with the particle until it is directly observed and measured. Sure, we know the shapes of electron shells and other aspects in a broader context, but we can never predict the exact nature of an individual particle until we measure it. I think human agency/free will might be similar in nature. Just like a particle, it is influenced by context, but there is always space there for uncertainty and the spark of spontaneity, a sort of freedom. Particles and minds are different in scale and category, it’s the idea of some undeniable mystery that creates space for very important, ethically foundational concepts to remain relevant. We should work to avoid sophomoric assumptions in any case. And I will point out the idea of free will as outlined above is still very compatible with physical reality in the same way it is for, say, electrons.

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DwayneWashington t1_j8gq1br wrote

But the fact that we don't know what's going on with the particle doesn't mean its path isn't determined.

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zossima t1_j8hankn wrote

I am not denying any sort of determinism. What I am getting at is, like with a particle, there is no way to fully access and completely explain individual agency. Consider recent discoveries in quantum mechanics. Experiments have proven that quantum particles can exist in multiple exclusive states at once (https://www.science.org/content/article/reality-doesn-t-exist-until-you-measure-it-quantum-parlor-trick-confirms). The particle does not collapse into a definitive state until observed. Consider what if the mind is a quantum computer of sorts, with myriad conceptual states coexisting at once in our brains. Surely the concepts are tied to physical states, however they all exist as potentialities in our brains.

There is a certain freedom there at a fundamental level shrouded in that we do not fully understand all of the aspects of consciousness and volition. As with anything you can manipulate a person (impose your will), treating an other as an object, as in a Buberian I-It relationship. Or context can influence a person. However, in many circumstances we are not being overly influenced by context, be it social media, drugs, the full moon, illness, and so on. In circumstances lacking an overwhelming burden of influence on our volitive capacities, I would argue we do have free will, as fragile and at times fleeting as it may be. It’s why Buber raises up the I-You relationship as a preferable way of encountering other beings. Maybe we would all be more free if we could only just stop trying to impose our own will on others. Here’s to hoping Nietzsche wasn’t right that everything is will to power. And maybe all of the above are possible and it’s our choice at any given moment which is real to us?

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DwayneWashington t1_j8hcph3 wrote

I don't think I'm smart enough to comprehend a lot of this... But "there is no way to fully access and completely explain individual agency" sounds like it doesn't exist or maybe we just don't have the mental capacity to understand it yet.

I don't really understand the "if we feel like we have agency, then we have it" idea ...where does that logic end, if I feel like I'm God am I God?

I don't know a lot about this topic so i apologize, I'm sure a lot of my questions have been talked about already.

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Bowldoza t1_j8hr9jw wrote

Claiming agency or perspective is not akin to claiming godhood. Be reasonable. Comprehending agency as a concept in light of a deterministic chain of events is about as good as you can get in regards to "free will".

Kinda off topic, but in this context I would believe that someone claiming Godhood in a similar comparison would be doing so from an solipsistic and egotistical perspective precisely because they perceive their own agency but can't or refuses to extend that potential to other people.

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DwayneWashington t1_j8hsscx wrote

Ok...so if I feel like I don't have agency then I don't, right? So that means that humans have agency and don't have agency at the same time?

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zossima t1_j8iqqpv wrote

I think "it depends" is probably an apt thing to posit here.

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zossima t1_j8irtby wrote

I would agree we just don't understand it yet. I think it is a real jump to conclusion with implications that outpace the assumption to assert everything is determined. You might as well become a practicing Calvinist. No need to apologize. The core of what I am getting at is we really do not know enough, or at least that agency is too complex and nuanced a concept with wide-ranging ethical bearing to settle on the stance there is no free will because all is pre-determined. Frankly, I feel the belief is not just pessimistic and ethically problematic, but a bit lazy.

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Foxsayy t1_j8grjfb wrote

>Consider the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle. We cannot predict with full accuracy the physical qualities of a particle like position from initial conditions. [...] I think human agency and free will might be similar in nature. Just like a particle, it is influenced by context, but there is always space there for uncertainty and the spark of spontaneity and for a sort of freedom.

Currently, we have to assign probabilities for where electrons might be, as far as I understand. So essentially, it's up to chance, randomness. Let's say that they're truly is Randomness in the universe, and could you make the same choice at the same point in time again, you might choose differently.

However, if the only reason that actions are not entirely predictable is because your decisions are being made partially by some Quantum dice roll, how can you call that free will any more than you can choose the outcome of a dice roll at the casino?

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zossima t1_j8h1xuo wrote

My point is the randomness might not be so random when it comes to human agency, perhaps there is room there for decision-making, even if flawed, influenced and at times ineffectual.

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tough_truth t1_j8h5iv8 wrote

>randomness might not be so random when it comes to human agency

This is where the “delusion” comes in, imo. Ultimately, it seems many believers of free will also disbelieve in the laws of physics. You seem to think humans can defy randomness through sheer willpower.

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Foxsayy t1_j8j98yi wrote

>My point is the randomness might not be so random when it comes to human agency

I'm trying to think of a good metaphor for this, unsuccessfully, and I think that might be because there aren't really things that work this way.

Something is either random, or it is not. Although you can bound the domain, they're really isn't an in between. So if you have the set of all things random, and human agency does not fall in that set, then human agency must fall within that set's compliment (the compliment of all random things), which is by definition, things that are not random–that is, systematic, predictable, causal, etc.

Therefore, if human agency and decision making is not entirely random, then it must be nonrandom. So you're either accepting randomness as a given (to some degree) in the universe, in which case it still doesn't allow for free will in the traditional philosophical sense, or you're rejecting that the process is up to randomness, in which case you fall back into determinism. ,

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EleanorStroustrup t1_j8hihq2 wrote

> If an individual does not have real control/agency over their actions, how are those actions truly their fault?

Exactly. They’re not. We recognise this in the justice system in many ways already. Many jurisdictions give sentence reductions to people whose childhoods were shaped by traumas, or who have mental health difficulties, for example.

> Culpability is out the window.

Whether the person is culpable for the action (or whether the idea of a person is even physically meaningful), and whether we should apply a judicial consequence for it, are not the same question.

Why are you asking these questions in a way that implies they disprove the idea that we lack free will?

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