>Perhaps if the monarchy hadn't been, or hadn't been seen as, the puppet of foreign interests, Iranians wouldn't have had such a dislike for it.

That was a big trigger in 1979, but over the longer term there had also been an erosion of perceived domestic legitimacy of successive dynasties from the 18th century onward: the last dynasty's origin in a fairly modern-looking military coup (allegedly with British involvement) didn't endear it to legitimist detractors, though as ever the clergy varied in its engagement with the throne.

Religious traditionalists were also alienated by the Pahlavi rulers' sporadic modernisation efforts: it's too readily forgotten that Khomeini's final breach with the throne came not over its pro-western leanings or autocratic rule but over the 1963 land reform which he saw as eroding the proper rural hierarchy. The revolution's mix of popular and traditionalist aspirations underlies much of its subsequent evolution and the idiosyncrasies we may find perplexing.