It gave a very good impression of having done just that: its army was in retreat, the would-be architect of victory Ludendorff had cracked up and run off, its allies were falling in rapid succession (by the last week there weren't any left) and the civilian population was at the end of its tether.

Militarists and nationalists subsequently boasted that the army remained in being, that Germany had not been invaded, and that it had signed an armistice rather than a surrender, and therefore that it wasn't a defeat - the corollary being that in dictating disadvantageous peace terms the allies had somehow abused German magnanimity in calling it a day.

But in reality, by late 1918 the Reich's options were few and unappetising: the big push in the west hadn't achieved the promised victory, and Allied commanders had at last worked out how to overcome the formidable German defences after four years of trial & error, while the US would become an ever more powerful factor in Allied strength.

Germany might have fought on into 1919, but for what? It had lost, and the subsequent treaty was about as just as anything that was likely to emerge from the carnage. The "let's call it a technical draw" take was understandable as a desperate spin by negotiators seeking easier peace terms, but bore little resemblance to reality.